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Days before the American campaign against Afghan-
istan began, an editorialist of the government jour-
nal Al Thawra chose, to give an indication of the gen-
eral mindset of people in Yemeni streets, to publish
the words of a corn vendor and some of his clients lo-
cated on the Sanaa Aden route in the heart of the old
country. 'How dare America claim that it is combat-
ing terrorism, while it itself terrorizes the entire
world?' asked the vendor. 'How dare they accuse us
of not being able to protect the "Cole" [destroyer]
whereas they themselves were not able to protect
their Pentagon?' 'Not a bad analysis', noted the edi-
torialist, 'maybe we should have him appointed to
Foreign Affairs in Sanaa.' 'You're not spot on yet',
said his travel companion with a note of irony, 'it is in
Washington, at the State Department, that he should
be appointed!'
The Sanaa Chronicle
The editorialist, ex-president of the Univer-
sity of Sanaa, Abdelaziz Maqaleh, is a man of
letters renowned throughout the entire
Arab world. He is not particularly 'Islamist'.
As an old Baathist, he would have even been
inclined to distance himself from that gen-
e r a t i o n .
But it is in an almost unanimous fashion
that the Yemenite vox (populi) manifests a
double reticence. The news that, for once,
the pilots were Arab and the victims Ameri-
can seemed to certain people to exorcise an
old evil spell. Few, however, spontaneously
identify with the presumed actors in the sui-
cide attacks against the World Trade Center
or the Pentagon. Nonetheless, and all politi-
cal affiliations taken together, no one ac-
cepts the categories of the American dis-
course of war 'against terror'. Depending on
whether one launches the bombs or re-
ceives them, depending on whether those
bombs come from armament factories of
the 'big ones' of the world or the backyards
of those who combat them, the juridical
qualification of terrorism is, as we know, the
object of long-standing controversies. 'Give
us your aeroplanes and we will give you our
cradles' was a phrase already pronounced
by Algerian independence fighters to the
French colonial forces. In Sanaa, as in the
rest of the Arab world, armed resistances to
the world order that originated at the end of
the 1980s from the breakdown of the USSR
are less automatically criminalized. The
rhetoric of he who apparently succeeded in
administering such a terrible blow to the ar-
rogant United States indeed arouses a cer-
tain degree of curiosity. On every street cor-
ner, one is offered recordings of his inter-
views, recent or not so recent. Listening at-
tentively to them can be very instructive for
several reasons. Behind the religious rhe-
toric of legitimation and that nasty habit of,
a little like George Bush it is true, dividing
the world into two irreconcilable camps, we
especially discover very profane and very
banal anti-imperialist claims. Usama bin
Laden is the son of a Saudi entrepreneur of
Yemen origin, who can boast of having re-
stored the three most sacred mosques of
Islam: those of Mecca, Medina, and Jeru-
salem. It is the occupation of the homeland
of the former two and the feudalization of a
great number of regimes of the Peninsula
and of the Arab world that feed the most ev-
ident of Bin Laden's frustrations. 'Even a
chicken, if an armed man takes some of his
territory, will fight the man! And that is just a
chicken! [É] We do not demand anything
more than the right given to every living
creature, not to mention humans, not to
mention Muslims: the right to defend one-
s e l f . '1 The occupation of the Al-Aqsa
mosque, symbol of the age-old Palestinian
conflict, although chronologically first,
comes in second place, he willingly admits.
But Palestine has always been present in his
preoccupations, contrary to what those who
blocked this invasive filiation seemed to
think. The murderous embargo on Iraq is
the third great source of exasperation, with
the long procession of 'double standard
policies' of the West in this region of the
world. 'Why are massive arms of destruction
reserved for only one of the two camps?'
'Why was Iraq not condemned when it em-
ployed its chemical weapons against
Khomeyni's Iran?'
We can also come to understand by listen-
ing to Al-Jazeera the disquieting distance
that is forming between information on
Western and Arab-speaking shores. Al-
Jazeera is not, as certain people have tried
to make us believe, the 'propagandist' chan-
nel of the Islamist guerrilla. On the other
hand, Al-Jazeera does not forbid allowing its
listeners to know Ð if for nothing else, if they
so wish, to better condemn Ð its motivation
and objectives. And this is where the big dif-
ference lies. The more or less scholarly cal-
culations by which a former student of the
Department of Economy of the University of
King Abdelaziz of Jeddah exposes the ex-
tent of financial loss of oil countries since
the Saudi princes, along with the US admin-
istration, have the common cause of bring-
ing down the price of the barrel, do not
manage to reach television audiences of the
West, despite their fondness of 'informa-
tion'. It seems preferable to insist on the
simplifying and warlike dichotomies (believ-
ers vs. non-believers) of the protg of the
(former allies of the USA) archaic Taliban. It
is not certain that 'information' will benefit,
in terms of quality, from all this. From the all
too often unanimist incantations of CNN il-
lustrating the strikes 'against terror' to the
contrasted debates of Al-Jazeera, in which
the voice of America is never excluded nor
even mistreated, it would seem that the old
torch of mediatic objectivity is changing
camps Ð an unpleasant defeat for Washing-
ton and its allies.
Return to the Arab political
n o r m ?
Political Yemen had, for a time, a precious
particularity: the Islamists, well implanted in
a society in which the religious norm re-
mained very rooted, were less repressed
and ostracized than they were integrated
into the system, in any case in the now
hegemonic North.2 Due to their participa-
tion in the revolutionary struggle against
the absolutism of the Zaydite i m a m a t ( d u r-
ing the 'Constitutional Revolution' of 1948
and the civil war from 1962 to 1970) the Is-
lamist current gained historically important
credit in the eyes of President Ali Abdallah
Saleh's regime. Until 1994, the latter regu-
larly instrumentalized some of its members,
in not always noble combats it is true, to
eliminate the 'communists' of the South.
This proximity of the political power with
the universal (Islamist) enemy at the mo-
ment (is the parliament of Sanaa not led by
an Islamist sheikh elected with the votes of
the party in power!) disturbs a number of
Yemen's Western partners. Visiting Sanaa,
journalists from the world over, with a
touching unanimity, have chosen without
exception to interpret this complex political
Yemen through the sole prism of those
'Afghans' that the regime is accused of hav-
ing tolerated for too long on its soil and
those Islamists 'that it does not combat vig-
orously enough'. The old habit of tribes of
settling their business, by abducting
tourists, with a central state that is rather 'in-
complete' facilitates even further all the
amalgams. Tribes and beardsÉ!: Bin Laden
cannot be too far away.3
The present Yemeni formula does not,
however, have only bad sides. The relative
calm of the country with respect to the
American campaign on Kabul and Ð com-
paratively speaking Ð the relative liberalism
that prevails is notably due to the fact that
the real political forces are integrated into
the system. Despite all of its limitations, the
Yemeni regime is not merely content with
manipulating the puppets of pluralism that,
from Egypt to Algeria, passing through
Tunis, form the substratum of the current
Arab 'democracy'. In the wake of the 11 Sep-
tember events, President Ali Abdallah Saleh
managed to conclude a pact of moderation
with those who may have been tempted to
act against the United States and its allies.
An anti-American demonstration did take
place, but this was in Amrane, some 50 kilo-
metres north of Sanaa, far from the televi-
sion cameras. This fragile equilibrium 'that
burns the hand of the state leader' as he was
keen to say to several foreign visitors, risks
being re-questioned under international
pressure. The United States in fact demands
each day more 'guarantees' in the battle
against 'terrorism', the frontiers of which we
know increasingly little since it includes
henceforth formations of Palestinian or
Lebanese resistance. The chief of state
could thus at any given moment seize the
opportunity of the American injunctions to
give in to repressive complaisance. Yemen
will perhaps come even closer to the institu-
tional 'Arab' 'norm'. The more or less trun-
cated elections (the president-candidate of
the presidential elections of 1999 did not
tolerate any adversary other than another
member of his own party4) already form part
of the system. The only thing left is the re-
pression by the regime of half or even more
of the political landscape. The country will
perhaps then attain the felicity of Western
recognition and be qualified (according to
the formula that the French chief of state
employed in 1996 with respect to the
Tunisia of General Bin Ali) as an 'exemplary
experiment of modernization'. 
A daily scene:
boys bathing in
a b i r k e h.
